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ABSTRACT 
Accidents involving rotating equipment in chemical, petrochem­
ical, petroleum, and gas plants can result in damage to other 
process equipment and catalysts along with lost production. 
Conversely, process upsets, process instrumentation failure, or 
failures of other process equipment can result in damage to rotating 
equipment. An effective rotating equipment loss prevention 
program will be an integral part of an effective plantwide loss pre­
vention program, since all aspects of plant operation and 
maintenance affect rotating equipment. 
Specific rotating equipment loss prevention recommendations of 
the chemical, oil, and gas business unit of one insurance company 
are presented. Rotating equipment loss statistics of one insurance 
company are also presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rotating equipment loss prevention is of vital interest to 
insurance companies. One insurance company's experience has 
been that, when losses for all industries are ranked by the size of 
an average loss paid, rotating equipment accounts for seven of the 
ten largest averages (Figure 1 ). In a study of losses paid in the 
chemical, oil, and gas industries from 1 980 through 1 995, about 36 
percent of all losses paid involved damage to rotating equipment; 
results of this study are shown in Figure 2. (All loss history studies 
mentioned herein are based on the Claims Department database of 
one insurance company. For a description of how this data is 
obtained and classified, refer to the Incident Investigation And Loss 
Mitigation section later.) 
Insurers of the petroleum refining, chemical, petrochemical, 
and natural gas transmission industries see a wide range of loss 
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Figure 1. Relative Size o,f' Average Loss for Ten Equipment Groups. 




Figure 2. Losses Represented by Six Equipment Categories. Data 
are for the chemical, oil, and gas industries during the time period 
1980 through 1995. 
prevention tools and techniques applied to prevent rotating 
equipment damage and resultant lost production. Through accident 
and incident investigations, they also see what loss prevention tools 
and techniques work, which ones fail, and the reasons for success 
or failure. Based on their experience, insurance companies develop 
internal guidelines and standards for rotating equipment loss pre­
vention that they recommend to their customers. Insurance 
companies can be a valuable, unbiased resource for plant rotating 
equipment engineers trying to maximize rotating equipment safety 
and reliability at minimum cost. 
104 PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH TURBOMACHINERY SYMPOSIUM 
Some of the rotating equipment loss prevention recommenda­
tions of one insurance company are presented. The chemical, oil, and 
gas business unit of this insurance company currently insures more 
than 60 companies in the petroleum refining, chemical, 
petrochemical, and natural gas transmission industries; in recent 
years, more than 1 00 companies in these industries were 
insured. Rotating equipment loss prevention recommendations 
presented herein were developed through many years of insurance 
experience at hundreds of plants and through lessons learned by 
investigating accidents and incidents at those plants. 
References/More Information 
The rotating equipment loss prevention recommendations 
presented are based entirely on one insurance company's experi­
ence in the chemical, oil, and gas industries. However, the author 
has referenced technical papers or articles by independent experts 
that support most recommendations and opinions presented. For 
those interested in chemical, oil, and gas plant loss prevention in 
general, the referenced papers and articles provide detailed discus­
sion and can be a valuable loss prevention resource. 
INSURANCE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 
Risk Selection-Evaluation Of Potential 
New Chemical, Oil, and Gas Accounts 
The business of insuring rotating equipment in the chemical, oil, 
and gas industries has changed significantly in the last few years. 
Previously, most accidents involving rotating equipment were 
covered under a mechanical breakdown policy; this policy was also 
called Boiler and Machinery insurance. The most common type of 
insurance purchased today by companies in the chemical, oil, and 
gas industries is All Risk insurance. All Risk insurance covers 
virtually all process equipment in a plant for a wide range of perils 
including fire and explosion along with mechanical breakdown. 
Catalyst and similar materials may also be covered. With All Risk 
insurance, the insurance company (just like plant personnel) is 
interested in a loss prevention program that protects all process 
equipment including catalyst and similar materials. This was true 
to a certain extent when separate fire and mechanical breakdown 
policies were common, but it is much more evident today. 
Problems with rotating equipment can result in damage to other 
process equipment and/or catalyst, and process upsets or failures of 
other process equipment can result in damage to rotating 
equipment. Therefore, from the insurance company's point of 
view, the rotating equipment loss prevention program must address 
all aspects of plant operation and maintenance. 
Studies have shown that approximately 20 percent of serious 
chemical, oil, and gas plant incidents are directly caused by human 
error, and human error is a contributing factor in up to 90 percent 
of serious plant incidents [ 1 ]. While rotating equipment and other 
process equipment can be protected to a certain extent through 
engineering means (inspection, nondestructive examination 
(NDE), vibration, and overspeed trips, etc.), other loss prevention 
tools are required to reduce the number of incidents related to 
human error. The following is a partial list of items the insurance 
company evaluates when assessing the potential insurance risk rep­
resented by a new chemical, oil, or gas account: 
• Management-This is the single most important element of any 
loss prevention program. If a loss prevention program is to be suc­
cessful, it must have the support of senior management. Senior 
management drives the loss prevention program through policies 
and procedures and through the budget process. When evaluating 
most of the items listed below, the insurance company is actually 
evaluating management. 
• Company/Plant History-Including insurance losses, major 
incidents, OSHA Incident Rates, and plant/equipment history 
• Process Safety Management (PSM) Programs-Since most 
chemical, oil, and gas operations fall under requirements of 
OHSA's Process Safety Management Program (CFR 1 9 1 0. 1 1 9), 
the prospective customer's PSM program is evaluated in some 
detail. Most of the PSM elements, if successfully implemented, are 
excellent tools for reducing the number of incidents caused by 
human error along with incidents related to process design! 
engineering deficiencies. In addition to reviewing the overall PSM 
program, audit results and the status of changes/corrections 
recommended in the audit( s) are noted. If the prospective customer 
is a member of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the 
plant's progress in meeting the goals and requirements of the 
Responsible Care program are reviewed and evaluated. As with 
CFR 1 9 1 0 . 1 1 9, Responsible Care program elements can be 
excellent loss prevention tools. 
Evaluation of PSM elements includes detailed evaluation of 
maintenance and predictive maintenance practices and procedures, 
reliability programs, operator and craftsman training programs, 
operating instructions, etc. 
• Feedstock Source/Redundancy 
• Storage Capacities-Feedstock, intermediate, and finished 
product 
• Unit Interdependencies 
• Redundant Equipment-Installed spare machines or spare 
machines available inplant or elsewhere 
• Critical Spare Parts-For large or unique critical, unspared 
rotating equipment and reciprocating machines, the following 
spare parts are normally required for business interruption 
insurance: 
• 1\vo complete sets of bearings and seals 
• Spare rotating element (two or more machines may share a 
common spare) 
• Spare diaphragms may be required in some instances de­
pending on several factors including the type of machine and the 
b11siness interruption potential represented by the machine 
• Spare set of stator blades for axial flow compressors and 
expander turbines 
• Spare coupling(s) 
• Spare gears for enclosed gearsets (or at least gear material 
with drawings for final machining) 
• Spare copper or windings for induction motors-depending 
on the type of wire and its availability 
• Spare stator for some synchronous motors 
• Spare armature for some DC motors 
• Spare cylinder of each size, piston, bearings, valves, and connec­
ting rod (or at least a rod forging) for reciprocating equipment. 
It is important that spares are stored properly and are properly 
maintained [2]. Critical spares are routinely inspected by insurance 
loss prevention specialists to evaluate condition and fitness for 
service. 
Loss Prevention Activities For Existing 
Chemical, Oil, and Gas Insurance Accounts 
The above described risk evaluation process is conducted by the 
insurance company's technical specialists. The specialists' report is 
reviewed by engineering and underwriting personnel. If the risk 
appears acceptable, an insurance premium is calculated based on 
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the risk represented. The premium is quoted to the prospective 
customer. 
If the account is insured, the insurance company's engineering 
and technical specialists develop a loss prevention service plan. 
The service plan specifies minimum amounts and types of loss pre­
vention activities required to protect the insurance company's 
interests; these activities will be performed by the insurance 
company's loss prevention specialists. Most of the insurance 
company's loss prevention resources are focused on the plants, 
units, and specific equipment that represent significant physical 
damage and/or business interruption insurance exposure. 
Insurance Recommendations 
During risk evaluations, accident investigations, and loss pre­
vention inspections, the insurance company's loss prevention 
specialists are comparing conditions observed to the insurance 
company's internal guidelines and standards, to common industry 
practices the loss prevention specialists observe at other insured 
plants, and to well known industry standards such as ASME, API, 
and NFPA. In addition, the loss prevention specialist is observing 
how the customer's own loss prevention policies, procedures, and 
standards (including PSM/Responsible Care where applicable) are 
being implemented in practice. 
The insurance loss prevention specialist may make informal, verbal 
suggestions for improvement to plant personnel. However, when 
significant conditions are observed that should be reviewed, 
particularly if changing or correcting the observed condition(s) 
would require expenditure of significant funds, a formal 
recommendation is made. Each insurance company has its own 
recommendation classification system, but most systems are 
similar. The classification system used by one insurance company 
for rotating equipment and process related recommendations has 
the following definitions: 
• Code. This classification applies only to boilers, pressure 
vessels, and other equipment that falls under the jurisdiction of a 
governmental authority. Code recommendations apply only to vio-. lations of the applicable Code and are made only when the 
insurance loss prevention specialist is a representative of the juris­
dictional authority. 
• Advisory. These are suggestions for improvement based on 
industry practice, insurance company experience, and industry 
guidelines. Advisory recommendations are primarily made for the 
benefit of the customer, and noncompliance with an Advisory rec­
ommendation will usually not affect insurance coverage. 
• Priority. These are recommendations for conditions that 
represent a significant risk to the insurance company. 
Noncompliance with a Priority recommendation could have an 
effect on insurance coverage. 
Since the recommendation type is based on risk to the insurance 
company, the same recommendation could be "Advisory" or 
"Priority" based entirely on the insurance coverage in effect. This 
is an important point that is often misinterpreted. The recommen­
dation is not more valid if it is "Priority" rather than "Advisory;" 
both are equally important in preventing losses. 
A different classification system is usually used for fire protec­
tion-related recommendations. 
Incident Investigation and Loss Mitigation 
Investigation of incidents involving equipment damage or near 
misses represents an opportunity not only to learn how to avoid 
repeating the same type of incident in the future, but also to 
diagnose potential problems with management systems before a 
more serious event occurs [3, 4]. Insurance companies can be a 
valuable member of the incident investigation team; in addition, 
investigation of incidents that could result in an insurance claim is 
usually a condition of insurance specified in the insurance policy. 
Insurance companies want to be involved early in incident inves­
tigations primarily for three reasons: 
• To have the opportunity to help mitigate business interruption 
losses-Insurance companies have experience in mitigating losses, 
and they can be a valuable resource to the customer's staff 
following an incident. Some insurance companies maintain 
databases of firms that stock used equipment, firms that provide 
materials, and firms that specialize in repairs to various types of 
equipment. 
• To detect trouble prone models or types of equipment-Some 
insurance companies have design engineers that regularly meet 
with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to discuss failure 
rates of particular components and to follow changes/modifica­
tions to those components. 
• To develop incident/loss data-By analyzing this data, the 
insurance company identifies priorities for allocation of its loss 
prevention assets. 
During investigations, the insurance company's loss prevention 
specialists classify and code various types of information such as 
industry, type of equipment, first part to fail, type of failure, and 
root cause. 
At one insurance company, rotating equipment failure root causes 
are categorized in seven broad categories: design, construction, 
repair, application, maintenance, operation, and external. Failures 
are further classified within categories. As an example, in each of the 
design, construction, repair, maintenance, and operation 
categories, there are four lubrication-related subcategories: 
contamination of lubrication, excessive, lubrication, insufficient or 
loss of lubrication, and unsuitable type of lubrication. Using this 
classification system, lubrication related failures can be grouped 
into lubrication failures due to the design of the system, improper 
operation of the lubrication system, inadequate maintenance of the 
lubrication system, etc. 
All of the insurance loss statistics referenced herein were 
derived from a database populated with incident investigation 
information using the above described classification and coding 
system. 
Rotating Equipment Nonroutine Repairs 
It is particularly important that the insurance company be 
involved in the investigation of mechanical damage to large or 
critical rotating equipment that requires substantial and/or unusual 
repairs. The insurance company will want to be sure all factors 
related to the failure are addressed so that the repaired equipment 
will represent the best possible insurance risk during future 
operation. 
Nonroutine repairs to large, critical rotating equipment are of 
particular interest to the insurance company. A nonroutine repair 
can be defined as a repair that significantly deviates from the 
original design of the machine. Examples include extensive case 
repairs, welding repairs to rotors, and welding repairs to crank­
shafts in reciprocating equipment. The repair firm performing 
these types of repairs will normally state that the repair will be 
done on a "best effort" basis; that is, the repair firm will not 
guarantee the results of the repair since the proven OEM machine 
design has been altered to an unproven design. Even if the repair 
firm does guarantee the repair, the guarantee will not cover lost 
production if the repaired machine fails. Since most, if not all, of 
the physical damage and business interruption deductibles are 
likely to be consumed while performing the repair, most of the 
financial risk involved with operation of the repaired machine will 
be borne by the insurance company. If a repaired rotor fails and 
destroys the case, or if a case repair fails and severely damages the 
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only remaining rotor, a catastrophic business interruption loss may 
be incurred. Therefore, the insurance company will normally 
provide its own design engineers, metallurgists, etc., to serve on 
the repair team to ensure the highest probability of success in the 
repair design. 
It should be noted that the repair firm and the customer's 
engineers are certainly capable of designing and performing suc­
cessful nonroutine repairs; successful nonroutine repairs are 
performed regularly without input from insurance companies. 
However, if the equipment is insured, all parties concerned will 
benefit if the insurance company's engineers participate in the 
design and monitoring of the repair. The primary reasons are: 
• The insurance company's design engineers are experts in non­
routine repairs and are usually provided at no cost to the customer. 
In every nonroutine repair the author is familiar with, the insurance 
company's design engineers and metallurgists brought good ideas 
to the table that were used in the final repair design. Rather than 
being simply the "repair police," the insurance company's 
engineers were a valuable part of the repair team, and the final 
design of the repair was enhanced by their participation. 
• If the insurance company's engineers are used in the design of 
the repair, the repaired machine is likely to be insurable when it is 
returned to service; there will be no second guessing or doubts 
about fitness for service from an insurance point of view. 
• When the insurance company's engineers are involved in the 
repair design, there is a greater likelihood of the repair being con­
sidered permanent, rather than temporary, from an insurance point 
of view. 
One insurance company has classified turbomachinery rotor 
welding repairs and issued repair guidelines for each classification. 
Details of this classification/repair guideline system are available 
free of charge from the insurance company [5]. 
PREVENTING CATASTROPHIC LOSSES 
RELATED TO ROTATING EQUIPMENT 
From the insurance company's point of view, a catastrophic 
rotating equipment loss is a failure that results in a large physical 
damage or business interruption insurance loss in excess of the 
deductible. It is possible for an incident involving rotating 
equipment to result in a large insurance loss even though the 
rotating equipment itself is not damaged or is only slightly 
damaged. For example, a process gas compressor could surge 
resulting in a process upset. Even though the compressor may have 
been undamaged by the surge event, the process upset may result 
in reactor catalyst damage, pressure vessel or fired heater damage, 
or worse [6, 7, and 8]. 
A catastrophic rotating equipment loss or incident may involve 
a severe personnel hazard in addition to financial loss. 
Some specific recommendations for preventing serious rotating 
equipment incidents follow. The following lists of recommenda­
tions for various rotating equipment, and various rotating 
equipment-related practices, are not intended to be all inclusive. 
On the contrary, the author has attempted to list only those recom­
mendations that: 
• When not followed have caused, or have the potential to cause, 
serious accidents. 
• In the author's experience are not always followed by all plants. 
• In the author's experience are controversial; there is wide dis­
agreement between industries or between companies in the same 
industry. 
• The author thought would be of interest or value to rotating 
equipment users. 
The following recommendations are based solely on the 
experience of the chemical, oil, and gas business unit of one 
insurance company, and some recommendations may not be 
applicable to other industries. Due to the wide range of rotating 
equipment applications in the chemical, oil, and gas industries, 
some of the following recommendations may not be applicable to 
every application in those industries. 
The Incident "Chain of Events " 
Studies have shown that serious accidents or "near misses" are 
almost always the final event in a series of lesser events and/or 
errors [9]. If any event in the chain of events is eliminated, the cat­
astrophic event will be avoided. A typical chain of events involving 
a steam turbine overspeed accident is shown in Figure 3; this sim­
plified series of events is based on an actual catastrophic loss 
involving a steam turbine. 
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Figure 3. Typical Sequence of Events Leading to a Catastrophic 
Rotating Equipment Accident. 
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If any single "event" shown in Figure 3 had been prevented, the 
accident would not have occurred. Effective loss prevention 
programs reduce the number of "events," which in turn reduces the 
probability of catastrophic losses. A broad approach that reduces 
the frequency of all events is more effective than concentrating on 
preventing a single event such as failure of the overspeed trip 
system. 
The following are specific rotating equipment loss prevention 
tools, techniques, and recommendations: 
Steam Turbine Overspeed Wrecks 
A catastrophic overspeed wreck of a steam turbine used to drive 
a large process compressor represents one of the most serious 
business interruption exposures encountered in the chemical, oil, 
and gas .industries. In a large refinery fluid catalytic cracking unit 
(FCC), or in a large ethylene unit, methanol unit, or similar unit, 
the catastrophic wreck of a large steam turbine could result in a 
business interruption loss of $300,000 to more than $1 ,000,000 per 
day, and the replacement time for a large industrial drive steam 
turbine case could be six to 15 months. Jn addition, ti·agments 
produced by the centrifugal explosion of a steam turbine can 
puncture process vessels and/or piping resulting in a large fire 
and/or explosion. 
The average cost of a steam turbine overspeed accident is greater 
than the average costs of all other steam turbine incidents (Figure 
4). In the chemical, oil, and gas industries, the average cost of a 
steam turbine overspeed loss greatly overshadows the average 
costs of losses due to other causes (Figure 5). Based on one 
insurance company's experience, most large steam turbine damage 
is caused by improper operation, improper repair, or inadequate 
maintenance as opposed to faulty materials or design deficiencies 
(Figure 6). Within these broad categories, the leading specific loss 
causes were excessive vibration, fatigue or con·osion, water 
induction, and overspeed (Figure 7). 
CAUSE OF LOSS 
Figure 4. Relative Size of Average Loss for the Seven Most 
Common Causes of Steam Turbine Damage. Data include all 
industries for the time period 1980 through 1995. 
Generally speaking, three events must occur before a steam 
turbine used to drive a process compressor or pump can overspeed 
to the point of a rotor burst that destroys the case: 
• There must be a sudden, large loss of load on the steam turbine. 
• The governor valve must fail to control the speed of the turbine. 
• The overspeed trip system must fail to function properly. 
CAUSE OF LOSS 
Figure 5. Relative Size of Average Loss for the Five Most Common 
Causes of Steam Turbine Damage. Data are for the chemical, oil, 
and gas industries during the time period 1980 through 1995. 
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CAUSE OF LOSS 
Figure 6. Losses Represented by Five Categories of Steam Turbine 
Damage Causes. Data are for the chemical, oil, and gas industries 
during the time period 1980 through 1995. 
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Figure 7. Six Most Common Specific Causes of Steam Turbine 
Damage. Data are for the chemical, oil, and gas industries during 
the time period 1980 through 1995. Combined percentages do not 
total OO percent because less common causes are not shown. 
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If any of the three events are eliminated, the steam turbine likely 
will not overspeed to the point of a centrifugal explosion that 
destroys the case. 
The greatest probability of success in preventing a catastrophic 
steam turbine overspeed accident lies in proper coupling installa­
tion and condition monitoring to ensure excessive stress is not 
applied to the coupling while the turbine is in operation. While 
steam turbines driving process compressors can certainly 
overspeed without coupling or shaft failure, the probability of 
losing the steam turbine case is relatively low unless the coupling 
or shaft fails thereby reducing the driven load very quickly. Most 
steam turbines driving process gas compressors or pumps will not 
overspeed to complete destruction if they are still under a 20 
percent to 30 percent load, and turbines driving a cavitating pump 
or surging compressor generally still operate under 20 percent to 
30 percent of full load. In addition, when a pump is cavitating or a 
compressor is in surge, the load on the steam turbine is reduced 
slowly compared to the rate of load loss if the coupling or shaft 
fails. The relatively slow loss of load provides more time for the 
governor system and/or overspeed trip system to function; it also 
provides more time for a component failure to occur, such as a 
blade failure or rotor rub, that might limit the speed of the turbine 
or produce enough vibration to cause the trip/throttle valve to 
close. Of course, the same cannot be said for steam turbines driving 
generators; those turbines can lose a very large percentage of load 
very quickly without coupling failure. [10, 11] Also, it should be 
noted that a pump with a completely blocked suction may not put 
even a 20 percent load on a driving steam turbine, and the turbine 
can overspeed to complete destruction [12]. 
If a component fails or the rotor rubs, the turbine may be 
severely damaged, but the diaphragms and case will likely be 
reparable. Assuming a spare steam turbine rotor is in stock, the 
business interruption loss might only be three to eight weeks to 
repair the case and diaphragms as opposed to six to 15 months if 
the case is destroyed. 
The above is not intended to imply that steam turbine governor 
systems or overspeed trip systems are not important; in fact, they 
are critically important. However, the frequency of governor 
system failures and overspeed trip system failures is very high 
relative to the frequency of coupling failures. With proper proce­
dures and diligence, correct coupling installation is relatively 
straightforward. With proper vibration analysis, misalignment and 
other causes of coupling distress can be detected and corrected 
prior to coupling failure. Coupling failure can be prevented rela­
tively easily compared to preventing governor and overspeed trip 
system failures. Preventing governor and overspeed trip system 
failures is more difficult because those failures are often related to 
steam purity problems; steam purity is discussed in the Steam 
Turbine Rotor Disk Failure section later. Of course, every effort 
should be made to ensure the overspeed trip system and governor 
system are functioning properly by following the manufacturer's 
recommendations for periodic exercising and testing. 
The previous discussion on steam turbine overspeed wrecks 
concerns steam turbines in normal operation. A large percentage of 
steam turbine overspeed wrecks occur while performing an 
overspeed trip test with the turbine uncoupled from the driven load 
or operating at a very low load. Due to the increased risk during an 
uncoupled, or low load, test of the overspeed trip system, one 
insurance company has long had a specific exclusion in its standard 
policy for damage incurred during maintenance or testing of steam 
turbines. 
Frequency Of Steam Turbine Overspeed Wrecks. Overspeed 
wrecks of large steam turbines are relatively rare; however, they do 
occur. One insurance company's loss data for all industries 
includes 24 overspeed incidents in the time period of 1980 through 
1995; 15 of the 24 involved industrial steam turbines as opposed to 
large steam turbine-generators used in the utility industry. 
In the chemical, oil, and gas industries, the same insurance 
company's data includes four large steam overspeed wrecks; one 
was in an ammonia plant, two were in chemical plants, and one 
was in an ethylene plant. The primary cause of two incidents was 
improper coupling installation; in all four incidents, governor and 
overspeed trip systems also failed to function properly. Numerous 
other overspeed wrecks of large steam turbines are detailed in the 
referenced literature [12]. A gas turbine used to drive a pipeline gas 
compressor also oversped to complete destruction in recent years. 
The financial and safety implications of a large turbine 
overspeed wreck are such that even one accident is too many. 
The frequency of overspeed wrecks involving smaller steam 
turbines is higher than the frequency of large steam turbine 
overspeed wrecks. Smaller steam turbines usually have less sophis­
ticated governor systems and overspeed trip systems, and they 
usually do not have continuous condition monitoring instrumenta­
tion. Small steam turbines are often spared, so lost production 
resulting from an accident is usually not significant. The financial 
consequences of a small steam turbine overspeed wreck are small 
enough that these wrecks may not get entered into an insurance 
loss database. Therefore, reliable insurance statistics are scarce 
regarding the frequency of small steam turbine overspeed wrecks. 
Subjectively, the author is personally aware of numerous small 
steam turbine overspeed wrecks; turbine repair shops can verify 
that small steam turbine overspeed incidents are not uncommon. 
Recommendations To Prevent Small Steam Turbine Wrecks. 
Although the replacement cost of a small steam turbine may not be 
a serious concern, the risk of damage to nearby piping and vessels 
and a resulting fire or explosion are very significant concerns. Of 
course, personnel safety implications of a small steam turbine 
overspeed wreck are very serious. The following are specific rec­
ommendations for small steam turbines: 
• Governors and overspeed trip systems should be tested and 
maintained on a regular basis; generally, they should be tested and 
maintained at least annually and more frequently if steam quality 
is poor [11, 13]. 
• Vibration monitoring and/or alignment checks should be 
performed often enough to detect excessive stresses being applied 
to the coupling so that corrections can be made well in advance of 
coupling failure [13]. 
• Where practical, mechanical governors should be upgraded to 
hydraulic governors or electronic governors [11, 13]. 
• Where practical, mechanical overspeed trip systems should be 
replaced with, or supplemented by, electronic overspeed trip 
systems [13]. Advantages of electronic governors and electronic 
overspeed trip systems are discussed in the next section: 
Recommendations To Prevent Large Steam Turbine Overspeed 
Wrecks. 
• Some small steam turbines are designed to overspeed to destruc­
tion with the case intact. On these turbines, upgrading governor or 
overspeed trip system protection would not be justified solely for 
safety reasons; upgrading may be justified for reliability reasons 
depending on the specific application. 
• Lube oil and hydraulic oil coming into contact with any 
component in the governor system or overspeed trip system must 
be clean, in good condition, and free of water [8, 11]. 
Recommendations To Prevent Large Steam Turbine Overspeed 
Wrecks. The following are specific recommendations to prevent 
overspeed wrecks of large industrial steam turbines: 
• Design of couplings should be carefully reviewed, and a liberal 
safety factor should be used in the design of couplings; high 
stresses can be transmitted to the coupling due to problems in 
connected machines [ 14]. 
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• Specific, detailed, written procedures should be in place for 
coupling inspection and repair. Critical steps in coupling installa­
tion should be witnessed by someone other than the craftsmen 
installing the coupling. Coupling installation steps and witnessing 
should be documented. Craftsmen should receive very thorough 
training in coupling installation practices; this training should be 
periodically repeated as refresher training, and all training should 
be documented [15]. 
• Couplings should be inspected at every opportunity. Excessive 
forces applied to couplings will result in specific failure modes; 
unusual coupling wear or damage should be thoroughly investigat­
ed and the root cause corrected [16, 17, 18]. 
• Large steam turbines and driven equipment should be equipped 
with adequate continuous condition monitoring systems. The term 
"large steam turbines and driven equipment" cannot be accurately 
defined in regards to the level of condition monitoring instrumenta­
tion needed; the level of sophistication required for machinery train 
condition monitoring systems should be determined primarily by 
safety considerations and business interruption exposures. Large 
turbomachinery trains in units such as refinery FCC and reformer 
units, ethylene units, ammonia plants, and methanol plants should 
have state-of-the-art condition monitoring systems including the 
capability for very fast, automatic data acquisition during periods of 
unusual/transient operation [19, 20]. The author is aware of 
numerous "saves" of large rotating equipment at customers' plants 
where advanced vibration analysis, in conjunction with a conserva­
tive operating philosophy by plant management and operators, 
enabled large machines to be shutdown before a serious wreck 
occurred. Advanced condition monitoring systems have also repeat­
edly proved valuable in diagnosing the cause of a trip so that the 
probability of serious damage during a restart of the machine is 
greatly reduced. State-of-the-art condition monitoring systems are 
not "bells and whistles;" they are tools that, when properly used by 
well trained rotating equipment engineers, can significantly reduce 
rotating equipment failures and lost production. Condition monitor­
ing systems on critical machinery trains that represent large 
business interruption exposure should be upgraded when significant 
advances are made in technology. 
Having said all of the above, there may be instances where 
upgrading condition monitoring systems is impractical. One 
example might be very old equipment that may be replaced in the 
near future. Whatever condition monitoring system is used, every 
effort should be made to diagnose and correct conditions that create 
excessive stress on couplings well in advance of coupling failure. 
The following interlocks (trips) are recommended for large, 
critical machines equipped with reliable continuous condition 
monitoring instrumentation: 
• Excessive axial vibration trips as a minimum-Excessive 
radial vibration trips are also preferred, but they are usually 
optional from an insurance viewpoint. Severe thrust damage can 
occur relatively quickly; an operator usually cannot manually trip 
the machine fast enough to prevent severe thrust damage [21]. The 
time required to repair excessive thrust damage to the diaphragms 
or case can be costly from a business interruption viewpoint. 
Repairing damage following excessive radial vibration often can 
be done more expeditiously; of course, this damage can still be 
quite extensive. Vibration monitoring and trip systems should be 
installed in accordance with API Standard 670. 
• Excessive bearing temperature trips-Bearing tempera­
ture probes should be imbedded in the bearing metal. A trip on high 
rate of increase in the bearing temperature may 
offer more protection than a specific temperature trip point-partic­
ularly with thrust bearings. 
• Vibration analysis and/or alignment checks should be 
performed often enough that conditions such as misaligmnent, 
which can produce excessive stress on the coupling, are detected 
well in advance of coupling or shaft failure [16, 22, 23]. It should 
be noted that detection of excessive misalignment forces using 
vibration analysis is more difficult, or at least the type of vibration 
produced is different, on machines with flexible disc type 
couplings [16, 24]. 
• Electronic governors and electronic overspeed trip systems are 
highly preferred. Electronic systems have several significant 
advantages compared to mechanical governor and overspeed trip 
systems; these include: 
• Much of an electronic overspeed trip system can be tested 
while the equipment is in normal operation [11]. Online testing of 
electronic overspeed trip systems should be performed at least 
annually; more frequent testing is desirable. 
• Electronic governors generally respond more quickly to 
load changes [11]. 
• Electronic governors can be mounted off the turbine elimi­
nating the need for governor drives [11]. 
• Electronic governors can provide control over a wide speed 
range [11]. 
• With electronic governors, process controls can input to the 
turbine speed setting [11]; this may reduce the probability of 
process upsets in some applications. 
• Automated turbine operation, including startup and 
shutdown sequences, is easier with electronic governors [11]. 
• Control of turbine variables other than speed is possible 
with electronic governors [11]. 
• Electronic overspeed trip systems are redundant; the failure 
of any single component will not result in a lack of overspeed pro­
tection or a nuisance trip. Use of triple redundant components and 
two-out-of-three voting logic can increase reliability even further. 
With mechanical overspeed trip systems, the failure of a single 
component can result in loss of overspeed protection or a nuisance 
trip [11]. 
• With electronic overspeed trip systems, an overspeed trip 
test can be performed while the turbine is operating at, or less than, 
normal operating speed. Using proper equipment and procedures, 
an electronic overspeed signal is used to simulate overspeed and 
actuate the overspeed trip system [11]. This greatly reduces the 
danger associated with overspeed trip testing with the turbine 
uncoupled or under very low load. A large percentage of steam 
turbine overspeed wrecks occur during uncoupled/low load 
overspeed trip testing. In the author's opinion, this single 
advantage should be sufficient to justify upgrading to electronic 
overspeed trip systems. 
• Electronic overspeed trip systems can be adjusted easily. 
Adjustment of mechanical overspeed trip systems is sometimes 
very difficult and time consuming [11]; the adjustment often 
occurs at a time when the steam turbine is needed to get the plant 
back into operation. 
• Upgrading some steam turbines to electronic governors 
may eliminate various linkages and gears that are sources of 
mechanical problems [2]. 
• Most of the above listed advantages of electronic governors 
and electronic overspeed trip systems that increase steam turbine 
safety also increase reliability and increase process control. 
Economic advantages of electronic overspeed trips and electronic 
governors alone may be sufficient to justify system upgrades; the 
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author is aware of several upgrades to electronic governors that 
were made primarily for economic reasons. 
• As a general rule, mechanical overspeed trip systems should be 
tested at least annually. More frequent testing may be needed if 
steam purity is questionable. The overspeed trip should be tested as 
soon as the machine is taken out of service and before any cleaning 
or adjustments are made; this test is the best indication of whether 
the testing frequency is adequate. If the overspeed trip fails to 
function properly during this test, the test frequency should be 
shortened if the reason for the failure can ot be positively identi­
fied and corrected [25]. Items to consider if the overspeed trip 
frequency is extended beyond one year include: 
• Steam purity must be adequately controlled and monitored. 
Refer to the Steam Turbine Rotor Disk Failure section later for 
details on steam purity monitoring and control. 
• Previous overspeed trip tests, conducted prior to cleaning 
and adjustment, should have been successful indicating the testing 
frequency could safely be extended. 
• If unscheduled unit outages occur, the opportunity should 
be taken to test the mechanical overspeed trip system. 
• Each time the steam turbine is shutdown for a scheduled outage 
after being in service for an extended period, the turbine should be 
stopped by tripping the trip/throttle valve. The closing time of the 
trip/throttle valve should be accurately measured during this trip. 
The closing time of the trip/throttle valve should also be accurate­
ly measured during overspeed trip tests. If the closing time is 
excessive, the cause should be determined and corrected [25]. 
• Steam turbine trip/throttle valves should be exercised at least 
monthly [26, 27, 28]; more frequent exercising and testing may be 
desirable depending on the application [27]. For most industrial 
drive steam turbines in the chemical, oil, and gas industries, one 
insurance company recommends weekly exerctsmg. 
Manufacturers of the steam turbine, governor, and trip/throttle 
valve should be consulted regarding proper testing, exercising, 
inspection, and maintenance frequencies and procedures. More 
frequent exercising is necessary if steam purity is questionable. 
Generally speaking, governor valves and trip/throttle valves should 
be cleaned, inspected, and repaired during each major turnaround 
of the unit; more frequent cleaning, inspection, and repair may be 
required depending on the application and steam purity [ 1 1 ]. 
Most large trip/throttle valves are designed to be exercised 
without affecting the speed of the turbine and without producing a 
nuisance trip of the turbine; however, it is common for operations 
personnel to be reluctant to exercise governor valves and 
trip/throttle valves for fear of a process upset or nuisance trip. It is 
important that operators have confidence in the systems so that 
exercising is performed regularly. Operator training sessions 
during commissioning or other opportune times, during which 
each operator actually exercises the governor valve and trip/throttle 
valve while the turbine is online, can be effective in instilling con­
fidence that the systems can be exercised without incident [26]. 
These training sessions should include detailed explanations of 
why exercising is critical to ensure reliability of the valve. 
• Specific, detailed, written procedures should be developed for 
overspeed trip tests [25]. 
• When performing an uncoupled or low load overspeed trip test, 
turbine speed should be controlled with a hand operated block 
valve; the speed should not be controlled with the governor valve 
or with another type of control valve [ 12 ,  25]. Some control system 
designs may not permit speed control with a hand operated block 
valve [ 1 2]. 
• Electronic overspeed trip systems should have at least two 
independent speed sensing systems [ 1 0]. In addition, the governor 
system should have its own speed sensing system [ 1 1 ]. The 
overall protection system design should ensure that both the 
governor valve and trip/throttle valve close when overspeed is 
detected [ 1 1 ,  25]. 
• Regardless of the redundancy of other components in the 
overspeed trip system, most large steam turbines in the chemical, 
oil, and gas industries have only one trip/throttle valve, and this 
valve is notorious for becoming inoperable due to steam purity 
problems or incorrect maintenance. From a mathematical proba­
bility viewpoint, two trip/throttle valves in series would increase 
safety; however, both valves could fail to operate properly due to 
poor steam quality (common mode failure), so the net increase in 
safety is debatable. 
The author is aware of one petrochemical plant that has installed 
two trip/throttle valves in parallel on large, critical steam turbines. 
During normal operation, only one valve is in service. (If both 
valves were in continuous service in parallel, the mathematical 
probability of turbine overspeed would be increased.) Each 
trip/throttle valve is sized to handle the full steam requirements of 
the turbine so that one valve· at a time can be tested without 
affecting production. This arrangement allows full stroking of 
trip/throttle valves rather than partial exercising. Also, by electron­
ic simulation of an overspeed condition, the entire overspeed trip 
system can be tested while the process unit is in normal operation. 
The valves are tested monthly; each quarter, valve closing time is 
checked to ensure steam contaminants are not affecting closing 
time. Obviously, the cost is greater than the cost for a single 
trip/throttle valve; however, increased safety and reliability, along 
with no lost production solely for overspeed trip system 
testing/maintenance, help justify the increased cost. 
• Most steam turbine overspeed accidents involve governor valve 
and/or trip/throttle valve sticking, and most governor valve and 
trip/throttle valve sticking is caused by impure steam [ 1 0]. Every 
effort should be made to ensure steam turbines operate on good 
quality steam. Steam purity is discussed further in the Steam 
Turbine Rotor Disk Failure section below. 
Steam Turbine Rotor Disk Failure 
Failure of a steam turbine rotor disk can also result in a cata­
strophic steam turbine wreck. From an insurance viewpoint, 
financial consequences of steam turbine rotor disk failure are 
similar to financial consequences of a catastrophic steam turbine 
overspeed wreck. The turbine case will likely have to be replaced, 
and objects around the turbine can be punctured or damaged by 
rotor blades or disk fragments. The following quote from the 
Twelfth Turbomachinery Symposium paper by Rogers, Wells, and 
Johnson [29] describing a large steam turbine wreck due to stress 
corrosion cracking in a rotor disk is an example of the damage 
potential in this type of accident: 
"The last stage disk had an 80 in OD and a 36 in ID, and it was 
17.5 in wide at the bore . ... Piece A-13 exited the turbine casing 
with a trajectory sloping upwards at about 15 degrees. Exiting 
the building, the segment sheared through a 12 in steel beam and 
perforated a 6 in thick reinforced concrete wall. The segment 
then struck a 55,000 lb transformer, whose end was displaced 
about 6 feet, deflecting the segment's trajectory slightly to one 
side. The segment came to rest 355 feet away from and 60 feet 
above the turbine axis. 
Piece C-3 separated from the shaft on a slightly downward tra­
jectory, producing extensive damage to structural members in 
the lower turbine casing and to the edge of a massive concrete 
wall that forms a part of the foundation. The segment ricocheted 
up from this area, denting the side of the cowling on the adjacent 
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IP turbine, damaging the insulation on piping beneath the 
cowling and producing a 3 foot deep dent in a steal beam in the 
wall of the building before coming to rest on the floor." 
The above described accident involved a very large rotor disk in 
a 138 MW turbine in a utility plant; damage from rotor disks in 
turbines 50 MW and smaller typically found in refining, chemical, 
and petrochemical plants would be less but still very serious. Most 
importantly, blades or disk fragments resulting from a process 
plant steam turbine wreck could rupture vessels and/or piping 
resulting in a serious fire and/or explosion. 
Prevention of steam turbine rotor disk failure is more difficult 
than preventing steam turbine overspeed wrecks because: 
• A single event, disk cracking, can result in an accident. There are 
only two ways to prevent the accident; one is to prevent the disk 
cracking-the other is to detect the disk cracking prior to failure of 
the disk. 
• Vibration analysis or other condition monitoring will not reliably 
detect steam turbine disk cracking. Disk cracking can progress 
undetected by routine vibration analysis [29]. 
Frequency of Steam Turbine Rotor Disk Failures. The author is 
not personally aware of any catastrophic insurance losses in the 
chemical, oil, and gas industries due to steam turbine rotor disk 
failure caused by cracking. Catastrophic failures of this type have 
occurred in other industries. 
In spite of the fact no catastrophic chemical, oil, and gas plant 
losses have been experienced due to steam turbine rotor disk 
failure, stress corrosion cracking of steam turbine rotor disks is  rel­
atively common. The author is personally familiar with the 
following steam turbine rotor disk cracking incidents involving 
large steam turbines in the chemical, oil, and gas industries : 
• Chemical Plant A: A rotor in a steam turbine driving a process 
air compressor suffered disk stress corrosion cracking due to 
carryover from a boiler steam drum. The spare rotor also experi­
enced disk stress corrosion cracking while the original rotor was 
being repaired. 
• Chemical Plant B: Several steam turbines driving process gas 
compressors in the same unit suffered rotor disk stress corrosion 
cracking due to excessive carryover from waste heat boiler steam 
drums. One steam turbine had disks cracked almost to the point of 
failure after only three weeks of operation (Figure 8). 
• Petroleum Refinery: Two steam turbines were opened for routine 
inspection after the first few years of what was thought to be 
normal operation. Eight or nine disks on each rotor had stress 
corrosion cracks. Due to cracking at the bore, one disk had moved 
axially on the shaft resulting in rub damage to diaphragms. 
Carryover from waste heat boilers in one unit of the refinery was 
suspected; impure desuperheating medium was also thought to be 
a contributing cause. In addition, metallurgical analysis of rotor 
material indicated the material would be very susceptible to stress 
corrosion cracking. The rotors were repaired (with upgraded 
material) ,  and steps were taken to minimize boiler carryover and 
correct the desuperheating medium purity problem. After another 
couple of years operation, one of the turbines was opened for 
routine inspection, and stress corrosion cracking was again found 
on the rotor disks. 
• Ammonia Plants : A study conducted of steam turbine failures in 
the anunonia industry found 45 occurrences of stress corrosion 
cracking type failures [30]. 
• Ethylene Unit: The rotor from an approximately 30,000 hp steam 
turbine was sent to the shop for repair of foreign object damage. In 
the shop, NDE found stress corrosion cracking in one disk. The 
plant was aware of at least one incident involving severe carryover 
from a waste heat boiler in the unit. The repaired rotor was 
Figure 8. Photograph of Steam Turbine Rotor Disk Cracked 
Almost to the Point of Failure After Only Three Weeks Operation 
with Impure Steam. 
installed during the next turnaround. The rotor removed during that 
turnaround was found to also have stress corrosion cracking in 
one disk. 
In addition to the steam turbine disk cracking noted above in the 
chemical ,  oil, and gas industries ,  the power generation industry 
also experiences the problem. Rogers, Wells ,  and Johnson quote an 
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) report that included data 
on 120 cracked steam turbine disks over a several year period [29]. 
Recommendations To Prevent Catastrophic Steam Turbine Disk 
Failure. The following are specific recommendations to prevent 
catastrophic steam turbine disk failure accidents : 
• Operate steam turbines with good quality steam. A common 
cracking mechanism in steam turbine rotor disks is  stress corrosion 
cracking. A complete discussion of stress corrosion cracking is 
beyond the scope of this paper; however a listed reference describes 
the mechanism in detail [31]. Generally speaking,  steam turbine 
disk cracking will not be experienced with good quality steam. 
There is no single definition of good quality steam; however, 
technical papers cover the subject in considerable detail [32, 33]. 
In the author's  experience, most steam quality problems are 
caused by changes in the steam system rather than the original 
design of the steam system. Most plants, or units in plants,  operate 
without steam purity problems for many years before suddenly 
experiencing a steam quality change and resultant steam turbine 
disk cracking. The following are some causes of steam quality 
problems;  this list does not include all of the causes of poor steam 
quality-only the most common: 
• Impurities enter the steam system, boiler feedwater system, 
attemporating or desuperheating system, or condensate system 
through leaks in heat exchangers, valves leaking through, improper 
regeneration of water softener resins, etc. Corrosion products and 
impurities migrate through the systems to steam turbines. 
1 1 2 PROCEEDINGS OF TilE TWENTY-FIFfH TURBOMACHINERY SYMPOSIUM 
• A steam boiler(s) is operated at higher capacity, due to chan­
ges in unit operation, debottlenecking projects, etc. Operating 
at higher capacity, steam drum carryover is experienced. 
• Steam drum carryover from a waste heat boiler(s) is experi­
enced due to process upsets;  process upsets result in operating the 
waste heat boiler at a higher steaming rate, an abnormally high 
water level in the steam drum, or in widely fluctuating steaming 
rates.  Carryover from conventional fired boilers can also be expe­
rienced under the same conditions. 
• Carryover from a steam drum is  experienced due to mechan­
ical failure of steam separation equipment in the steam drum or due 
to a design error involving steam separation equipment. 
• It is important that impurities entering the steam system, boiler 
feedwater system, condensate system, and attemporating/desuper­
heating system be detected quickly so that corrective measures can 
be taken and damage to steam turbines minimized or prevented. 
Stress corrosion cracking can progress  quickly [34]; severe disk 
cracking that resulted after only three weeks operation with very 
poor quality steam is shown in Figure 8. The following are a few 
items that can help quickly detect impurities in steam, boiler 
feedwater, and condensate systems:  
• Conductivity and/or pH analyzers should be used to contin­
uously monitor boiler feedwater and condensate systems so that 
impurities entering the systems will be quickly detected. Other 
types of monitors may be needed depending on the potential impu­
rities that can enter feed water and condensate systems at individual 
plants .  Appropriate alarms should be used for early detection of 
impurities in the systems [32, 33].  
• Steam purity should be continuously monitored with sodium 
analyzers and/or cation conductivity analyzers. Design and installa­
tion of sampling nozzles is critical for reliable results . Refer to 
ASTM, ASME, and EPRI Standards for correct sampling nozzle 
design and location information [32, 33]. 
• Operators must have proper training, including periodic 
refresher training, on maintaining steam purity. Operators should 
receive training in the consequences of a loss of steam quality. 
Operators should understand that steam purity excursions may 
occur very infrequently, but equipment can be severely damaged 
after operation with poor quality steam for a short time. Specific 
operator actions required should be documented in the Operating 
Instructions [32]. 
Even with good systems in place to detect impurities entering 
water and steam systems, steam turbine rotors may still be suscepti­
ble to cracking. Continuous monitoring of steam purity using 
isokenetic nozzles in steam lines and continuous analyzers is  not 
done in every plant, and where it is done, it has not always prevented 
rotor cracking. In the author's opinion, the lack of catastrophic 
steam turbine disk failures in the chemical, oil, and gas industries 
has been due, primarily, to the frequency of dismantled inspections .  
In  the author's  experience, every plant that experienced disk 
cracking thought steam quality was satisfactory prior to the 
discovery of cracks in steam turbine disks . If each plant had not 
performed a dismantled inspection of the steam turbine, the disk 
cracking could have progressed to the point of a catastrophic failure. 
Dismantled inspections of turbines and rotor NDE have been the 
"safety net" to catch disk cracking prior to catastrophic failure. 
Many plants are either increasing the time between dismantled 
inspections, or they are considering increasing the time, due to ,sig­
nificant cost savings possible with extended production runs 
between turnarounds . The following are some specific recommen­
dations for items to consider before extending dismantled 
inspection frequencies of steam turbines :  
• Extension of steam turbine dismantled inspection frequencies 
must receive formal multidisciplinary reviews and approvals 
equivalent to a process safety management (PSM) management of 
change procedure. Rotating equipment engineers cannot ensure, 
and are not responsible for, steam quality; therefore, other plant 
departments should be involved in the extension decision. 
Some plants have a PSM management of change procedure that 
includes changes that are not strictly design related; this type of 
procedure is highly preferred [35 ,  36]. 
• History and design of the turbine(s) involved should be carefully 
reviewed. Some steam turbine rotor designs are more susceptible 
to disk cracking than other designs [30, 34]. Metallurgical proper­
ties of the rotor disk are an extremely important factor in a rotor's  
susceptibility to al l  types of cracking; metallurgical properties will 
also affect the rate of crack progression. Actual metallurgical prop­
erties of the rotor disk may not be known without detailed 
metallurgical analysis .  
• Plant/unit steam system design, control, and reliability should be 
carefully reviewed; a process hazards analysis (PHA) may be 
needed. Typical questions to answer include: 
• Will operators know if adverse water, boiler feedwater, 
attemporating/desuperheating, condensate, or steam purity condi­
tions develop, and if so, how quickly? 
• What will be the result of instrumentation failure? What 
backup systems are in place? 
• Operator training in steam quality. 
• What will be the course of action if steam quality becomes 
suspect during the period of operation between turnarounds; will 
the extended run time between turnarounds be continued? How 
will the decision be made, and who will make it? This course of 
action should be agreed on prior to extending the turnaround 
frequency. 
• Reliability of boiler steam drum level control systems should be 
carefully reviewed. Loss of control of boiler steam drum levels is a 
common cause of carryover that leads to rotor disk cracking [33].  
Boiler steam drum level control i s  discussed further in the Steam 
Turbine Water Induction section later. 
The above comments are not intended to imply that operating 
intervals between steam turbine dismantled inspections cannot be 
increased; the comments are intended to point out potential risks 
involved and measures that should be taken to reduce the risk. 
Improving steam quality, or improving steam quality control ,  in 
a large refinery, chemical , or petrochemical plant is a major 
undertaking that requires a multidisciplinary, plantwide effort. 
However, the benefits of pure steam, boiler feedwater, and 
condensate will usually more than justify the effort. In addition to 
reducing probabilities of steam turbine rotor cracking and steam 
turbine overspeed due to sticking governor valves or trip/throttle 
valves, improved steam quality can result in lower maintenance 
· costs for a wide range of equipment; a few examples include: 
• Reduced corrosion in piping and vessels that handle steam, 
condensate, or boiler feedwater. 
• Reduced cleaning costs for heat exchangers, boilers, economiz­
ers, superheaters, etc. 
• Reduced steam trap maintenance costs and energy savings by 
eliminating wasted steam. 
• Reduced costs, and reduced risks, associated with cleaning 
steam turbines .  Though steam turbines can be safely cleaned 
online, there are inherent risks in the operation, and turbines have 
been damaged in the past during cleaning operations .  Even if steam 
turbines are not damaged during cleaning, overall maintenance 
costs and lost production can be minimized if the root problem, 
poor steam quality, is  reduced or eliminated [2, 37]. 
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Steam Turbine Water Induction 
Steam turbine damage due to water induction is relatively 
common in the chemical, oil, and gas industries (Figure 7) .  During 
one several-year period in the rnid- 1 980s, most of the medium to 
large oil refineries insured by one company had at least one large 
steam turbine damaged by water induction. In addition to wrecking 
the steam turbine, water induction can result in a severe process 
upset resulting from rapid slowing of the steam turbine and driven 
equipment. A process upset following water induction in a large 
steam turbine in an ethylene unit, ammonia plant, refinery FCC 
unit or reformer unit, methanol unit, and various other processes, 
could have very serious consequences .  
Preventing Process Upsets and Steam Turbine Damage Due To 
Water Induction. Various methods of detecting water canied over 
into steam lines are available; most of these use conductivity 
probes. There is an ANSIJASME Standard (ANSI/ASME TDP- 1 -
1 985) related to protecting steam turbines from water induction. 
Based on one insurance company' s  experience in the chemical, 
oil, and gas industries, the best means of preventing water 
induction to steam turbines is to have adequate control of the water 
level in boiler steam drums .  Due to the thermodynamics involved, 
boiler steam drum level control is  quite complicated. Boiler steam 
dmm level instrumentation must be reliable and redundant. In 
addition to offering the best water induction protection to steam 
turbines, reliable boiler steam drum level instrumentation is critical 
in reducing steam carryover that can render governor valve and 
trip/throttle valves inoperable and cause cracking in steam turbine 
rotor disks . The following are some specitic recommendations :  
• Equip boiler steam dmms, particularly process waste heat boiler 
steam drums, with reliable, redundant level instrumentation 
systems. The best system design the author is aware of uses three 
steam drum level transmitters in a two-out -of-three voting system 
for level control, indication, alarms, and trips [38]. Although 
Waltz 's  [38]  paper specifically addressed utility power boilers, the 
same general control system design would provide very reliable 
control for process waste heat boiler steam drum levels .  The 
control system described by Waltz allows the failure of any single 
component without loss of control of the steam dmm level and 
without loss of interlock protection. In addition, the probability of 
nuisance trips is  minimized. 
• Regardless of steam drum level control system sophistication, 
the most reliable means of determining the level in a boiler steam 
dmm is a direct indicating sightglass. Displaying images of one or 
more sightglasses at the point where the steam drum level is con­
trolled (usually the central control room) is highly recommended. 
The best means of displaying a boiler sightglass image in the 
control room is through the use of fiber optic systems [7 , 38 ,  39]. 
Of course, boiler steam drum sightglasses must be kept clean and 
in good condition if they are to be relied on. 
• There should be a high-high level interlock on each boiler steam 
drum to protect steam turbines from water induction. If a high-high 
steam drum level interlock is  impractical for some reason, boiler 
steam drum level indication and control instrumentation becomes 
even more critical; redundancy and reliability must be ensured, and 
operators should clearly understand the actions required if the 
boiler steam drum level becomes excessively high. 
Preventing Catastrophic Losses Related To Critical Compressors 
In the chemical, oil, and gas industries loss experience of one 
insurance company, centrifugal, axial, and rotary compressors 
represent the largest portion of rotating equipment losses (Figure 
9). In the event of rotor separation, steam turbines represent a 
larger risk to surrounding equipment than do compressors . 
However, production loss due to severe case damage can be as 
great with compressors as with steam turbines, since replacement 
times for large compressor cases are roughly equal to replacement 
times for steam turbines cases up to approximately 60,000 hp. 
Also, damage to other process equipment such as fired heaters, 
catalyst, and pressure vessels can be caused by problems related to 
compressors [8]. 
EQUIPMENT TYPE 
Figure 9. Portion of Total Losses Represented by Six Types of 
Rotating Equipment. Data are for the chemical, oil, and gas indus­
tries during the time period 1980 through 1995. 
A study by one insurance company of centrifugal , axial, and 
rotary compressor accidents in the chemical, oil, and gas industries 
indicated most losses were due to inadequate maintenance or 
improper operation as opposed to design or construction problems 
(Figure 1 0) .  Fatigue and vibration, water or foreign object 
induction, surge, and lubrication problems accounted for the 
greatest portion of total losses (Figure 1 1  ). The average loss size 
was greatest for liquid or foreign object induction, surge, and 
fatigue/vibration related accidents (Figure 1 2) .  
The following are specitic recommendations related to centrifu­
gal and axial flow process compressors : 
CAUSE OF LOSS 
Figure 10. Losses Represented by Five Categories of Centrifugal, 
Axial, and Rotary Compressor Damage Causes. Data are for the 
chemical, oil, and gas industries during the time period I 980 
through 1995. Combined percentages do not total 100 percent 
because smaller categories are not shown. 
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Figure 11. Most Common Specific Causes of Centrifugal, Axial, 
and Rotary Compressor Damage. Data are for the chemical, oil, 
and gas industries during the time period 1980 through 1995. 
Combined percentages do not total 100 percent because less 
common causes are not shown. 
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Figure 12. Relative Size of Average Loss for the Four Most 
Common Causes of Centrifugal, Axial, and Rotary Compressor 
Damage. Data are for the chemical, oil, and gas industries during 
the time period 1980 through 1995. 
• Compressors should have surge control systems adequate to 
protect the compressor and other process equipment. The required 
sophistication ofthe surge control system depends on the size and 
type of compressor and on the consequences of compressor surge 
on the compressor, the compressor driver, and other process  
equipment. In some applications, instrumentation that provides 
input to a surge control system may need to be redundant. 
In most applications, an operator cannot manually prevent com­
pressor surge. 
Conventional instrumentation may not respond fast enough 
to detect surge; high speed sensing and recording equipment 
may be required to detect surge and diagnose surge problems [6]. 
Surge control technology is available to meet the demands of 
any application [40]; however, in the author's experience, the 
correct level of surge protection is often applied only after a surge 
related accident or "near miss" occurs . Older, or simpler, surge 
control systems should be upgraded if justified by the potential 
consequences of a severe surge event; a history of operation 
without surge related damage, by itself, does not justify an inade­
quate surge control system if the consequences of a surge event are 
potentially very serious .  
Generally speaking, axial flow compressors are more vulnerable 
to surge damage than centrifugal compressors, and they require 
more sophisticated surge control instrumentation. Steam turbines 
used to drive compressors can also be damaged during a surge 
event [34]. One particular application usually requires the best 
available surge control system regardless of the type of compressor 
used; this application is the main air compressor in a refinery FCC 
unit. There may be exceptions based on the design of a specific 
FCC process, but this compressor usually should be equipped with 
the most redundant and most reliable surge control system 
available, since the consequences of surge can be especially 
severe [8]. 
• In some applications, check valves are very critical in protecting 
compressors . Malfunctioning check valves can result in compres­
sor damage due to reverse rotation or due to backflow of process 
materials into the compressor [8]. In the past, several very large 
losses involved compressor discharge check valves that did not 
function properly;  these accidents involved the main air compres­
sor in refinery FCC units. 
The correct type of check valve must be used, and two check 
valves in series may be required to achieve the necessary level of 
reliability. In some applications, such as the cracked gas compres­
sor in an ethylene unit, check valves may be required on the suction 
of a compressor along with the discharge [41] .  
Check valves must receive proper inspection and maintenance. 
Large check valves with external counterweights are usually 
equipped with an exercising system and/or an assist system to help 
the check valve open and/or close properly. These systems must 
receive proper maintenance and inspection to ensure the check 
valve will properly close and protect the compressor following 
a trip. 
Check valves should be exercised frequently enough to prevent 
binding or seizing of the shaft that can prevent closing. (Of course, 
some check valves have no external access to the main shaft and 
cannot be exercised.)  As is the case with steam turbine governor 
valves and trip/throttle valves, Operations perspnnel are often 
reluctant to exercise check valves for fear of creating a process upset 
or nuisance trip of the compressor. However, if proper procedures 
are developed and followed, exercising check valves will not result 
in enough change in the compressor discharge flow or pressure to 
cause a process upset or nuisance trip of the compressor. Large 
check valves with external counterweight assemblies are usually 
designed to be exercised while in service; the check valve 
manufacturer should be consulted regarding specific exercising, 
inspection, and maintenance procedures .  Operator training 
sessions during commissioning or other opportune times,  during 
which each operator actually exercises the check valve while the 
compressor is online, can be an effective method of instilling 
confidence that check valves can be exercised without incident [26]. 
• Temperature instruments with alarms should be supplied for 
each bearing on the compressor. Temperature sensing probes 
should be imbedded in the bearing metal [42]. The compressor 
should trip on high thrust bearing temperature; this provides a 
backup to the axial thrust trip. It may be preferable to have the 
compressor trip on a high rate of increase in the thrust bearing tem­
perature rather than trip at a specific temperature. 
• Instrumentation should be provided, with alarms, to monitor 
compressor discharge pressure, temperature, and flow. In some 
applications, the compres sor should trip on high discharge 
temperature. There is a well known problem with detonation/fires 
in piping on the discharge of air compressors in some applications, 
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and limiting the compressor discharge temperature i s  the primary 
means of preventing detonation/fires in these applications [ 43, 44]. 
The detonations and fires are caused by oil mist and/or a 
carbonaceous buildup in the piping. In the case of oil mist or vapor, 
the ignition source can be a spark due to mechanical failure in the 
compressor such as a broken valve. At elevated temperatures ,  the 
carbonaceous material can chemically react and self-heat to 
ignition. 
• Large, critical compressors should be equipped with continuous 
radial vibration monitoring instrumentation on each j ournal 
bearing and axial movement instrumentation with alarms [2, 421 . 
This instrumentation should be designed and installed in accor­
dance with API Standard 670. The compressor should trip on 
excessive axial movement of the rotor [2 1 ,  42) . Preferably, the 
compressor should also trip on excessive radial vibration, but radial 
vibration trips are usually optional from an insurance viewpoint. 
Radial vibration alarms must be provided and kept in good 
operating condition. 
• The main and auxiliary oil pumps should be equipped with 
discharge pressure and temperature instruments with alarms. The 
auxiliary oil pump should start automatically on low oil pressure. 
The auxiliary oil pump should have a power source independent of 
the main oil pump. The compressor should trip on low-low oil 
pressure. A compressor rundown oil system not dependent on any 
power source is highly preferred. If the compressor and its driver 
are not equipped with an emergency nmdown oil system using 
gravity or another nonpower system for pressurization (for 
example, nitrogen pressure), the auxiliary oil system becomes even 
more critical. The following items are preferred for an auxiliary oil 
system that also serves as the rundown oil system after a compres­
sor train trip: 
• Pressure switches used in the lube oil systems should be 
redundant. 
• The auxiliary oil pump motor overload protective device 
should alarm only; it should not trip the motor (the philosophy 
being: it is  well worth sacrificing a small electric motor to get a few 
more minutes of lubrication for a large compressor train). 
• Circuit protective devices for the auxiliary oil pump motor 
should be in the form of a magnetic type circuit breaker rather than 
fuses. The trip setpoint should be at least 50 percent greater than 
the maximum measured motor starting current. The maximum 
starting current may be up to five times the rated motor full load 
amps in some cases. 
• An energized type starter should be used for the auxiliary 
oil pump motor rather than a nonenergized type. 
There should be provision for testing the auxiliary oil pump 
while the compressor is in operation. The three position 
"Manual-Off-Automatic" switch routinely used on standby 
equipment designed to start automatically should not be used for 
critical auxiliary oil pumps, because if the switch is inadvertently 
left in the "Off' position after a test, the pump cannot start auto­
matically [42]. If this type of switch is used, there should be an 
alarm in the control room to indicate when the switch is in the 
"Off' position. 
If the main lube oil pump is shaft driven, and if there is even a 
remote chance the compressor can be rotated backwards after a 
trip, the auxiliary oil pump should start on low main oil pump 
discharge pressure rather than low shaft speed [ 4 1 ) .  
• Instrumentation may need t o  b e  provided t o  monitor gas 
molecular weight and/or gas composition with alarms. In some 
applications, the compressor should trip if gas composition or 
molecular weight exceed design parameters. 
• Level monitoring instrumentation with alarms should be 
provided for all suction, interstage, and aftercooler separator 
drums. The compressor should trip on high-high separator 
level [8]. 
• For air compressors, the inlet air filter differential pressure 
should be monitored and an a! ann provided. In some applications, 
the inlet filter can become restricted relatively quickly (sand­
storms ,  refinery FCC catalyst dust, etc.) ,  and filter cleaning based 
on hr of operation may be insufticient. 
Preventing Catastrophic Wrecks r�f' Gas Turbines 
A study by one insurance company concluded that gas turbine 
failures are usually model- specific and related to the design of the 
specific machine (Figure 1 3 ) .  Because of this fact, design 
engineers on the staff of one insurance company regularly meet 
with gas turbine OEMs to stay abreast of actions in progress to 
address  design related problems. In the study, specific causes of 
inadequate material properties and inadequate design accounted 
for almost half of all gas turbine losses ; improper operation and 
bypassed controls represented 29 percent of all losses. The study 
indicated gas turbines in the chemical, oil, and gas industries 
receive excellent maintenance; as a specific Joss canse, inadequate 
maintenance accounted for only three percent of gas turbine losses 
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Figure 13. Losses Represented by Six Categories of Gas Turbine 
Damage Causes. Data are for the chemical, oil, and gas industries 
during the time period 1980 through 1 995. 
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CAUSE OF LOSS 
Figure 14. Most Common Specific Causes of Gas Turbine 
Damage. Data are for the chemical, oil, and gas industries during 
the time period 1980 through 1995. 
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OEMs of smaller gas turbines often keep complete spare gas 
turbines in stock that can be used to replace failed units ;  this 
greatly reduces business interruption exposure. OEMs of larger gas 
turbines may stock a spare rotor(s) for some models ,  but availabil­
ity may not be guaranteed. 
In addition to serving as the prime mover for a compressor or 
generator, gas turbines used in process plants are often a primary 
heat source. Gas turbine exhaust may be directly injected into the 
process, or it may be used to generate steam or heat a hot oil 
system. Therefore, abnormal gas turbine operation has increased 
potential to generate process upsets. However, in the author' s  
experience, gas turbines have been reliable heat sources and have 
not resulted in excessive losses related to process upsets. One 
reason for gas turbine reliability may be the control systems; 
generally speaking, gas turbine control systems have been very 
automated for many years. Newer, solid state systems are also 
very redundant. 
The following are some specific recommendations for gas 
turbines used in process applications :  
• Fuel systems should be very reliable; it is  particularly important 
to avoid introducing the wrong fuel to a gas turbine. If process off 
gas is used as fuel, the btu content may need to be continuously 
monitored and trips provided. It is also important to ensure liquid 
fuel is  not accidentally introduced into a machine operating on a 
gas fuel. 
• If two or more gas turbines exhaust into the same system and 
dampers or valves of some type are used to isolate a gas turbine 
from the system when the turbine is down, it is important to have 
an interlock that trips the turbine, or prevents it from starting, when 
the damper or valve is in the closed position. 
• One common failure mode is  overheating in the power turbine. 
It is important to accurately monitor temperatures in various parts 
of the power turbine. In some gas turbine applications ,  upgrading 
temperature monitoring systems when significant advances are 
made in technology may be advisable. 
Expander Turbines 
The expander turbine loss experience of one insurance company 
has been poor. Although a relatively small number of losses 
occurred ( 1 8 losses in nine years) ,  the average cost of each loss was 
exceeded only by the average cost of losses involving steam 
turbine-generators (Figure 1 ) ;  the category of steam turbine-gener­
ators includes large power generation units up to hundreds of 
megawatts in size, whereas most expander turbines are roughly 30 
mw or less in size. 
In spite of insurance loss statistics ,  expander turbines are reliable 
machines. Some expander turbines have operated for many years 
with no significant problems. In a study conducted by one 
insurance company of expander turbine losses in the chemical, oil, 
and gas industries ,  all of the losses were related to improper 
operation or improper maintenance; no losses were related to the 
design or construction of the machine. The following are specific 
expander turbine recommendations : 
• In refinery FCC units, there should be an interlock to stop oil 
feed to the reactor riser any time the riser temperature is too low to 
properly vaporize the oil. Unvaporized oil entering the reactor can 
result in a severe process upset. Catalyst "burped" out of regenera­
tors has wrecked several expander turbines over the years. Severe 
damage to other equipment has also been experienced; one 
explosion is documented in the literature [8].  In spite of the history 
of this type of process upset, many FCC units have not utilized a 
low riser temperature interlock. 
• In refinery FCC units and nitric acid units, the normal operating 
temperature of expander turbines is close to the maximum design 
temperature of the machine; during process upsets, the design 
temperature of the expander turbine can quickly be exceeded. 
Process control instrumentation systems should be state-of-the-art 
to ensure process upsets are minimized. Operator training is  
critical ; refer to the section Other Rotating Equipment Loss 
Prevention Recommendations later for recommendations related to 
operator training. 
• Refinery FCC unit power recovery trains should have state-of­
the-art condition monitoring instrumentation including the 
capability for very fast data collection during abnormal/transient 
conditions [ 1 9 ,  and 22]. Alignment of the train is critical. Some 
expander turbines,  particularly older expander turbines, may not 
have overspeed protection capable of saving the turbine in the 
event of coupling failure. It is imperative that coupling stresses due 
to misalignment are minimized. 
• In refinery FCC units, expander turbines should not be operated 
for extended time periods with excessive vibration due to catalyst 
buildup in the turbine. Also, expander turbines should not be exces­
sively "thermal cycled" to dislodge catalyst buildup. While 
occasional thermal cycling is acceptable, the root cause of 
excessive catalyst carryover from the regenerator should be 
corrected rather than thermal cycling the expander turbine on a 
daily or weekly frequency for an extended period. 
Preventing Catastrophic Wrecks of Large Reciprocating 
Compressors and Internal Combustion Engines 
From an insurance point of view, a catastrophic reciprocating 
compressor or engine wreck includes crankshaft breakage, severe 
case damage, or loss of the case. Depending on the size of the 
machine involved, a broken crankshaft can result in repair costs of 
$400,000 to $2 million; repairs can take many months if a forging 
for a new crankshaft has to be ordered from the foundry. Major 
case repairs can take six weeks or longer; delivery of a new case 
could take six to twelve months or longer. 
A spare crankshaft is normally not required from an insurance 
standpoint. 
Case damage can often be repaired, but a case can also be 
damaged beyond repair; two recent accidents involved very large 
machines with cases that could not be repaired. In one accident, the 
case had to be replaced; in the other accident, the entire machine 
had to be replaced. Replacement of the case for a very large recip­
rocating machine can cost several million dollars. 
In spite of the fact that reciprocating compressors and internal 
combustion engines have been in industrial use for a very long 
time, practices and procedures involving reciprocating equipment 
vary greatly from industry to industry and from company to 
company in the same industry. 
Recommendations To Prevent Failures Of Reciprocating 
Equipment. It has been the experience of one insurance company 
that catastrophic wrecks of large reciprocating equipment are most 
often caused by excessive bending stresses on the crankshaft. 
Excessive bending stresses on the crankshaft, in turn , are most 
often caused by misalignment and/or uneven cylinder loads. Taken 
together, improper operation and inadequate maintenance 
accounted for almost 80 percent of reciprocating equipment losses 
in a study conducted by one insurance company (Figure 1 5). In the 
same study, specific causes of overloading, liquid or foreign obj ect 
induction, lubrication problems ,  and fatigue/excessive stress 
accounted for most losses (Figure 1 6). The following are specific 
recommendations for preventing catastrophic wrecks of large reci­
procating equipment: 
• Foundations must be properly designed and structurally sound. 
Grouting, baseplates,  and chocks or shims must be properly 
installed and in good condition. Anchor bolts must be securely 
anchored to the foundation; the bolts should secure the base of 
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Figure 15. Losses Represented by Six Categories of Reciprocating 
Equipment Damage Causes. Data are for the chemical, oil, and 
gas industries during the time period 1980 through 1995. 
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Figure 16. Most Common Specific Causes of Reciprocating 
Equipment Damage. Data are for the chemical, oil, and gas indus­
tries during the time period 1980 through 1995. 
the machine to the baseplate or chocks so that, during operation, 
the case does not move relative to the chocks or baseplate 
[45]. Tightening with a torque wrench may not apply the correct 
load to a large anchor bolt; hydraulic tensioning may be required 
[45 , 46]. Foundation, grout, and anchor bolt technology has 
changed significantly over the last 30 to 50 years; upgrades should 
be considered when machines are undergoing major overhauls 
and/or grout is being replaced [ 47]. The quality of foundation and 
grout work is often highly dependent on the skill and experience of 
the contractor, and the contractor's employees ,  performing the 
work; specific instructions and procedures should be provided for 
these projects, and adherence to instructions and procedures should 
be closely monitored. 
Loosening and retightening anchor bolts should not produce 
case movement; if it does, the grout may be failing. More than 1 .0 
to 2 .0 mil movement indicates the machine may be out of 
alignment. Case movement while loosening and retightening 
anchor bolts should be checked at least annually [48]. 
• If one or more compressor cylinders or engine cylinders are 
doing significantly less than their share of the total machine work, 
uneven stresses and temperatures may be applied to the crankshaft. 
Compressor valve performance should be monitored closely by 
monitoring discharge temperatures; all engine temperatures should 
be closely monitored [49]. Engine analysis is  also highly recom­
mended. Prompt detection and correction of weak cylinders and 
malfunctioning valves will increase efficiency, reduce overall wear 
of components, and reduce the probability of crankshaft failure and 
case damage due to bearing failure and/or misalignment. 
• Crankshaft web deflection readings should be taken at least 
annually. Since some crankshaft and/or alignment problems may 
not result in excessive crankshaft web deflection readings, at least 
one main bearing shell should be removed and inspected annually. 
It is important to inspect both sides of the bearing; some problems 
will produce wear or defects on the back side of the bearing 
shell [49]. 
• Protective instrumentation has the potential to detect developing 
problems and trip the machine before catastrophic damage occurs. 
The following are some specific recommendations for protective 
instrumentation on large reciprocating engines and compressors : 
• High bearing temperature trip-Bearing temperature probes 
should be imbedded in the bearing material when practical. 
• High vibration trip-Large reciprocating compressors and 
engines should be equipped with continuous vibration monitoring 
instrumentation. One design that has worked well utilizes a sensor 
mounted at a 45 degree angle (pointing towards the crankshaft) on 
each crosshead and one or more sensors mounted on the case of the 
compressor near a crankshaft main bearing. The sensors are 
connected to a vibration analyzer similar to that used with turbo­
machinery. Properly designed, installed, and maintained systems 
of this  type offer protection against catastrophic failures without 
nuisance trips. Some companies have also had success using 
systems of this type for vibration analysis. 
• Rod drop monitors-Rod drop monitors monitor the position 
and deflection of the compressor rod. If the rod moves beyond 
preset limits, an alarm or trip is actuated. A trip on excessive com­
pressor rod movement is recommended; this can minimize 
connecting rod and/or crankshaft damage following failures in the 
compressor cylinder area. 
• In one insurance company's  experience, preventive type inspec­
tion and overhauls of reciprocating equipment, particularly large 
integral gas engine compressors, has not satisfactorily prevented 
catastrophic failures. Some machines have operated many years 
without problems with only routine inspections and overhauls. 
However, the vast majority of machines that suffered broken crank­
shafts and/or severe case damage were also receiving regular 
inspection and overhauls. 
Some users have had good success with a philosophy of placing 
primary emphasis on rapid detection and correction of conditions 
that result in excessive stresses on the crankshaft (conditions 
discussed above) rather than routine inspection and overhauls. At 
least until proven unsuccessful, this philosophy i s  being accepted 
by one insurance company. These machines still receive the web 
deflection checks and bearing spot checks described above; 
however, major overhaul frequencies are based on indicated need 
rather than hours of operation. 
Other Rotating Equipment Loss Prevention Recommendations 
The following are additional rotating equipment loss prevention 
recommendations. Some of these recommendations will not be 
applicable for all rotating equipment applications. However, these 
items are essential components of a comprehensive loss prevention 
program for most plants. 
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• Good housekeeping around rotating equipment is important. 
Excessive accumulation of dirt, debris ,  and/or leaking oil can 
obscure leaks and other developing problems. If operators and 
maintenance craftsmen are slipping and sliding through puddles of 
oil and water, or having to inspect equipment through a cloud of 
smoke from hot oil or steam from steam leaks, the quality and 
quantity of visual equipment inspections will decrease. 
• Piping stress has been a contributing factor in some large rotating 
equipment losses. Piping stress  is addressed in the design of 
rotating equipment installations .  However, after the equipment has 
been in operation, it is important to ensure, on an ongoing basis, 
that piping stresses have not increased beyond acceptable limits .  
Piping stress can increase for many reasons; a few include: 
• A modification, addition, or deletion of system components 
• Corrosion, binding, or failure of hanger systems 
• Unusual thermal growth/contraction of high temperature 
piping systems-Changes in high temperature piping systems can 
be caused by process upsets, insulation/refractory failure, etc . 
Routine infrared inspection of large, high temperature insulated or 
refractory lined piping is recommended. 
• Piping vibration-Piping vibration can result in piping 
failure (a leading cause of fire and explosions in hydrocarbon 
handling plants) along with turbomachinery and reciprocating 
equipment problems [50, 5 1 ] .  
• Testing of alarms, interlocks, and instrumentation-Critical 
instrumentation, alarms, and interlocks should be tested at least 
annually; more frequent testing may be required [52]. During 
scheduled outages ,  machines should be shutdown by testing a trip 
whenever possible; when possible, the trip should be actuated by 
actually changing an operating parameter, such as level or 
pressure, rather than electrically actuating a relay, etc. 
• Electric motor failures are usually related to insulation 
failure-Insulation failure in tum is often caused by overheating. 
Insulation overheating is often caused by oil and/or dust 
accumulation in windings that reduces cooling. Electric 
motors, particularly larger motors (over 1 ,000 hp), generally 
should receive thorough inspection and cleaning every three to five 
years. The frequency of cleaning and inspection will vary greatly 
according to the design of the motor. Induction motors that are well 
sealed may need less frequent cleaning. More open designs ,  
particularly some synchronous motors, may need cleaning every 
one to three years. Cleaning materials and procedures must be 
chosen carefully to avoid damage to the windings .  All mechanical 
components in the motor should be checked for tightness, proper 
electrical connections ,  etc . ,  following cleaning. Electrical 
insulation tests should be performed regularly to detect weak 
insulation prior to actual insulation failure. 
• Backup power systems for alarm and trip circuits, auxiliary oil 
pumps, and control systems are very critical. Rotating equipment 
losses due to the failure of batteries in backup power systems are 
not uncommon. Battery systems should receive full load capacity 
testing and connection resistance testing in accordance with 
ANSI/IEEE Standard 450. 
• Commissioning/testing new or modified installations-Typically, 
rotating equipment is performance tested at the factory. It is 
important that rotating equipment also be tested, as thoroughly as 
practical, during commissioning. A thorough performance test 
during commissioning will usually reveal damage incurred during 
shipment, design deficiencies related to location specific compo­
nents such as foundations and piping systems, and installation 
errors. 
One critical component that usually cannot be effectively tested 
during the factory performance test is a compressor surge control · 
system; it is impractical to effectively simulate piping/process 
systems at the factory. Ideally, the calculated surge control line and 
surge control system effectiveness should be verified during com­
missioning by actually initiating carefully controlled surges [53 ,  
54]. The ability of the surge control system to handle process 
system upsets and trips should be verified [6]. 
Commissioning of new or upgraded equipment is an ideal 
time for hands-on training for operators and maintenance 
technicians [2, 26]. 
• Reliability programs-Reliability programs are highly recom­
mended. Reliability programs reduce the number of "events" as 
described in the Incident Chain of Events section previously; this 
reduces the probability of a catastrophic loss [55].  
Implementing successful reliability programs for rotating 
equipment usually requires a difficult change in the plant rotating 
equipment operating and maintenance "culture" [56]. However, the 
payback for undergoing the cultural change and successfully 
implementing a reliability program can be well worth the effort. In 
addition to reducing chances of catastrophic equipment damage 
and lost production, successfully implemented reliability programs 
can have a substantial payback in increased efficiency and reduced 
costs [55]. 
• Human factors programs-Human factors programs address the 
human element in loss prevention; human factors are a critical 
element in any loss prevention program. It is  impractical, if not 
impossible, to make chemical, oil, and gas processes immune to 
the effects of human error. It is also impractical to design rotating 
equipment that is immune to damage caused by human error. As 
the size and complexity of rotating equipment increase-and the 
size and complexity of chemical, oil, and gas processes 
increase-the importance of reducing the probability of accidents 
due to human error increases . 
Petroleum refining, petrochemical, and chemical processes, and 
the rotating equipment in those processes, can be protected to a 
certain extent through engineering means. For example, processes 
can be designed more inherently safe by reducing quantities of 
hazardous materials in the process ,  and interlocks, such as high 
temperature and high vibration trips ,  can be utilized to protect 
equipment and reduce the probability of uncontrolled reactions . 
However, history has proven that catastrophic accidents cannot be 
prevented even with the most sophisticated protective instrumenta­
tion systems .  The best examples are the Three Mile Island and 
Chemobyl nuclear power plant accidents. Even though these plants 
were designed with very sophisticated and reliable protective 
instrumentation systems, serious accidents occurred in both plants . 
Both accidents were caused, primarily, by a series of serious 
human errors [57,  5 8] .  
· 
(The author highly recommends the book "The Truth About 
Chemobyl" by Grigori Medvedev [58] to anyone interested in 
human factors as they relate to loss prevention. Mr. Medvedev was 
Chief Engineer during the plant's  construction in 1 970, and he 
returned to the plant to investigate the 1 986 accident. He also 
compares the Chemobyl accident to the Three Mile Island 
accident; in spite of the difference in design of the two plants, the 
sequences of events leading to the two accidents were strikingly 
similar.) 
As stated previously, human error i s  a contributing factor in up 
to 90 percent of process plant accidents . In process plants, there is 
a tendency to assume that the only critical human errors are those 
which occur on the part of operating and maintenance 
technicians. On the contrary, human error on the part of designers, 
suppliers, vendors, and technical support staff can all cause 
accidents . Several loss prevention theories are based on the belief 
that all industrial accidents are caused, primarily, by failures of 
management systems [3 ,  5 7]; accident prevention therefore must 
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address  management systems and, especially, the interaction of 
management systems, people, and facilities [ 1 ]. 
Human error "events" in the chain of events leading to rotating 
equipment failures can be minimized by the following: 
• Training-Training is critical in reducing human error. Training . 
must be effective, and it must be repeated on a regular basis ;  this 
includes training for managers, technical staff, administrative staff, 
and supervisors along with operating and maintenance technicians. 
Some modem processes operate for many years between major 
turnarounds, and most modem processes are highly automated. 
Because of these facts, it is very difficult for operators to obtain 
experience in dealing with abnormal process situations. The use of 
computer simulators enables operators to acquire this experience 
without risk to equipment or product, and the use of computer sim­
ulation for operator training is highly recommended [59]. 
During training, the method of presenting rotating equipment 
loss prevention information may be as important as the information 
itself. Audiences will usually apply loss prevention knowledge 
more effectively if the consequences of rotating equipment 
accidents are fully understood, and if the audience truly accepts the 
fact that past accidents not only can be repeated but are likely to be 
repeated [60]. The complex, automated nature of modem refining, 
chemical, and petrochemical processes also necessitates specific 
training in evaluation of, and response to, abnormal process situa­
tions; training methods used successfully in the past with less 
complex processes may no longer be sufficient to prevent cata­
strophic losses [61 ,  62]. 
Regularly repeated refresher training on rotating equipment 
basic practices and procedures ,  such as those documented in 
Sawyer 's Rotating Equipment Maintenance Handbook [63] should 
be very valuable. 
• Operating instructions and maintenance procedures-Well 
written operating instructions and maintenance procedures will 
reduce the frequency of human error. Writing operating instruc­
tions for process operators is a specialized task that requires 
professional skills [64]. However, process operators and mainte­
nance craftsmen should always  be involved in the development and 
review of operating instructions and maintenance procedures ;  their 
involvement will help ensure the final document is  usable on a day 
to day basis along with technically correct. 
• Corporate downsizing/reengineering-Loss of technical experi­
ence following reductions in force is a significant loss prevention 
concern; this includes experience at the unit, plant, and corporate 
levels. A formal, multidisciplinary study equivalent to a PSM man­
agement of change procedure should be performed to determine 
effects of reducing experience levels. This includes experience 
levels of operators, maintenance technicians,  and engineering staff 
[35 ,  65]. Experience levels in certain units may also be reduced by 
personnel transfers and promotions during times of rapid 
expansion [35 ,  62]. If required, internal or external consultants 
should be used to supplement existing plant rotating equipment 
experience. 
• Rotating equipment fire protection-Fires involving rotating 
equipment are not uncommon. Fire protection requirements for 
rotating equipment will generally be included in company 
standards and industry guidelines developed for process plants ; 
these are developed by fire protection engineers. The following are 
a few specific recommendations:  
• Large rotating equipment can be damaged by thermal 
shock, loss of lubrication, etc. , during fire fighting. This damage 
may be far more serious than any damage that would have resulted 
from a minor fire that was being extinguished. Written preplans 
should be developed for fighting fires around each large machine 
in a unit; these preplans should be discussed during plant fire 
brigade training sessions and practiced during drills. The objective 
of the preplan should be to match frrefighting efforts to the 
potential seriousness of the frre so that the fire is quickly extin­
guished without unnecessary collateral damage to rotating 
equipment. 
• Fixed suppression systems should be carefully designed, 
installed, and maintained to ensure correct quantities of the proper 
extinguishing agents are used and the correct type of nozzle is used 
in the proper orientation. Detection and suppression systems 
should be properly tested on a regular frequency. 
• To minimize the frequency and severity of lube oil fires, 
open ended lube oil lines should be plugged, or preferably, a blind 
flange installed; this is particularly important on pressurized lube 
oil lines, air bleed lines on filters, etc. Lube oil reservoir drain and 
sample lines should also be protected with blind flanges. If plugs 
or blind flanges are not used on lube oil sample lines and/or water 
drain lines ,  two valves in series should be used. The inside valve 
should be a screw type valve rather than a quick opening ball type 
valve. Leaks should be promptly repaired, and large accumulations 
of oil, or oil soaked dirt/catalyst on foundations and baseplates 
should be avoided. 
• Large quantities (55 gallon drums,  etc.) of spare lube oil or 
solvents should be stored in properly designed flammable storage 
areas ; they should not be stored near machines in the field or in 
enclosed compressor buildings. A minor rotating equipment lube 
oil fire that spreads to 55 gallon drums can quickly escalate to a 
major fire. 
SUMMARY 
Rotating equipment is an integral part of petroleum refining, 
chemical, petrochemical, and natural gas production processes. 
Failures or abnormal operation of rotating equipment can result in 
process upsets, damage to other process equipment and catalysts, 
and lost production. Conversely, process upsets and failures of 
process instrumentation or other process equipment can result in 
damage to rotating equipment. An effective rotating equipment 
loss prevention program will address all aspects of plant operation 
and maintenance activities-activities related to technical issues 
along with activities related to human factors. 
Specific rotating equipment loss prevention recommendations 
have been presented based on the experience of the chemical ,  oil, 
and gas business unit of one insurance company. Technical 
resources supporting the loss prevention recommendations have 
been included in the REFERENCES section. Insurance loss statis­
tics for rotating equipment have also been provided. 
Due to the wide range of rotating equipment applications in the 
chemical, oil ,  and gas industries ,  not all recommendations 
presented are applicable at every plant. Some recommendations 
will not be applicable to rotating equipment in other industries. 
Implementation of recommendations presented should result in 
increased efficiency and profits along with a reduction in the 
number and severity of plant incidents. Most importantly, imple­
mentation of recommendations presented should reduce the 
probability of catastrophic accidents in the chemical, oil, and gas 
industries ultimately reducing personnel injuries and financial 
losses while assuring a reliable stream of products to customers. 
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